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According to the law of Illinois as settled by the decisions of its tribunals, the
presumption as to the liability assumed by one who endorses a note to which he is
not a party, is that he is a guarantor, but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence that at the time of endorsement he stipulated for a different liability.
It is no ground for reversal at the suit of such endorser that the court below by
following the law of the forum instead of the law of the state where the note was
made and payable, instructed the jury that his presumed liability was that of an
endorser when it was in' fact that of a joint maker.
Where by statute a defendant is not allowed to deny the execution of the instrument sued on unless his plea be verified by affidavit and in a suit upon a guaranty
endorsed on a note the defendant verifies his plea of general issue, by affidavit, the
plaintiff is only bound to prove the execution of the guaranty and not the execution
of the note.
A secret agreement between partners not to assume any liability out of the line
of the partnership business, is no defence to an action on the endorsement of a corporation note, signed by one partner in the name of the firm, when it appears that
the partners were the owners of a majority of the stock of the corporation, and that
the note and endorsement were given for the benefit of that stock.
'Where the maker of a note has an account on his books with the holder as to
other transactions, which account has been balanced, showing nothing due by the
holder, the guarantor of the note, when sued by the holder, cannot set up as a defence
the items on the debit side of such account, without allowing the credits, or showing
fraud or mistake in striking the balance.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.
Mr. Chief Justice WAITE delivered the opinion of the court
There are nineteen errors assigned on this record, but those
relied on in the argument present in reality but four questions.
These are :
1. Whether the court erred in charging the jury that "if a
person not a party to a note, that is to say, not the payee or maker,
writes his name on the back of the note at the time the note is
made, the presumption is that he has assumed the liabilities anu
responsibilities of a guarantor; this presumption, however, is liable
to be rebutted by the proof."
2. Whether, under the practice in Illinois, which is regulated by
statute, if one is sued as a guarantor of a note, and he verifies his
plea of the geneial issue by affidavit, the plaintiff must prove- the
execution of the note itself as well as the guaranty.
3. Whether the defendants should have been permitted to prove
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that there was an agreement between themselves as partners, that
neither of them should assume any liability on behalf of the firm
out of the line of its regular business without the consent of the
others, and that one of the defendants did not know that the liability sued on was incurred until long after the notes were made and
endorsed, and that since he learned it he has always repudiated it.
4. Whether it was wrong for the court to instruct the jury that
if, as between the plaintiff and the maker of the note, the maker
could not use an account on its books as a set-off against the note,
the defendants as guarantors could not.
As to the first question, the charge as given states correctly the
law of Illinois, as-settled by the highest court of the state in a long
series of decisions: Cushman v. Dement, 3 Scam. 497; Stowell
v. Raymond, 83 Ill. 120. The contract, however, was made in
Missouri, and was to be performed there. In that state the rule is
that he who writes his name on the back of a note, of which he is
neither the maker nor the payee, is prima facie liable as a joint

maker: Powell v. Thomas, 7 Mo. 440 ; Schneider v. Seiffman, 20
Id. 571 ; Otto v. Bent, 48 Id. 26; Baker v. Block, 30 Id. 225.

For this reason it is insisted that the contract is governed by the
laws of Missouri, and that the jury should have been so instructed.
Admitting this to be true, it is difficult to see how the plaintiffs in
error have been harmed by the charge of which they complain.
They claim to have been presumptively joint makers of the note,
while the court told the jury they were guarantors only. Clearly
the charge as given was more favorable than the one contended for.
A recovery could have been had against them as joint makers under
the common counts.
the presumption from
The court, however, after stating what
law authorizes the
"the
say,
to
on
such an endorsement was, went
across the back
written
thus
name
the
holder of a note to write over
between ihe
made
that
of the note any agreement consistent with
to say,- if
is
that
parties at the time the name was placed there;
back of
the
on
name
the party did actually, at the time he put his
different
or
the note, stipulate for any liability short of a guaranty,
from that of the guarantor, then the holder of the note had no
right to write a false guaranty over the name." Then after calling
attention to the facts which had been shown in evidence, and the
claims of the respective parties, it was said: "If you are satisfied
that the defendants in this case put their names upon the note at
VOL. XXIX.-42
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the time it was made, with the express understanding that they
were to be liable as endorsers, that is, liable after the plaintiff had
used due diligence to fix their liability as endorsers, then the defendants are not liable in this action; but if, on the contrary, you
are satisfied from all the evidence in the case that the defendants
intended to become liable to pay the debt if the maker (lid not, that
is, that they would stand in the relation of sureties and guarantors,
substantially as the contract is now written over their names, then
the defendants are liable." And again, after referring to a condition which it was proved the plaintiffs in error had incorporated
into the obligation they assumed, and which it was insisted should
have been expressed in the guaranty as written over their signature,
the court said: "If you are satisfied that the positive performance
of this part of the agreement was thus waived or abrogated by
mutual consent of the plaintiff and defendants before the guaranty
was written, then no mention may be made of it." In this way,
as it seems to us, the case upon this point was fairly put to the jury
and the plaintiffs in error were given the benefit of every circumstance they relied on to establish their defence. If the presumption arising from their endorsement had been overcome by the
evidence, the jury were told in express terms to find accordingly.
As to the second question. A statute of Illinois provides that
"no person shall be permitted to deny on trial the execution or
assignment of an instrument in writing * * * upon which any

action may have been brought * * * or is admissible in evidence
under the pleadings, when a copy is filed, unless the person so
denying the same shall, if defendant, verify his plea by affidavit :"
fll. Stat., chap. 110, sect. 34.
This action was brought on a guaranty, a copy of which was
filed. The affidavit only made it necessary to prove the execution
of that instrument. That was done, and that of itself was equivalent to proof of an admission by the guarantors of the due execution of the note. Whether this admission was one that could be
contradicted, need not now be determined. It was sufficient until
overcome.
As to the third question. There is nothing in the case to show,
or tending to show, that the execution of the guaranty was not in
the line of the regular business of the partnership. On the contrary, it does appear that the partners were the owners of a
majority of the stock in the corporation that made the note, and
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that the note and guaranty were given with a view to the protection and improvement in value of that stock. The transaction was
one which appears to have been entered into for the common benefit of all the partners. Under such circumstances, it is of no
consequence what the secret understanding of the partners may
have been as to the powers of each. The contract being within
the scope of the partnership business, each partner is presumed to
be the authorized agent of all.
As to the fourth question. A simple statement of the facts is all
that is necessary to dispose of this question. The plaintiff was
the president of the corporation, maker of the note guaranteed.
On the books he was charged with moneys paid to him from time
to time and credited with a salary and interest on his investment
in stock. After he went out of office his successor settled with
him and paid the balance found to be his due. The books were
thereupon balanced: The plaintiffs in error sought to set off
against their liability as guarantors of the note, the items which
appeared on the debit side of the account, without any regard to
the credits. As to this, the court instructed the jury that they
"must be satisfied that the company itself could use the same setoff against the note before the defendants could avail themselves
of it, and that if they were satisfied from the evidence that the
plaintiff's account stood balanced on the books of the company as
kept, then the defendants could not set up the account as a set-off
to the note without showing fraud or mistake in striking such balance." There can be no doubt as to the correctness of this ruling.
This covers, substantially, all there is in the case. The other
errors assigned are unimportant and need not be considered speThe judgment is affirmed.
cially.
The liability of a stranger to a note,
endorsing the same before delivery, by
writing his name on the back of the
instrument, with the intention of giving
the maker credit with the payee, is one
of the most perplexing as well as one
of the most important of all the questions connected with the law of commercial paper. The investigation of
the subject shows that in almost every
state, indeed in every state with the
exception of Florida, an opinion has
been expressed as to the nature of the

liability assumed under such circumstances. But the conclusions reached
have been so various that it becomes
highly desirable to know which, of the
several theories which prevail, the courts
of each state have adopted as the rule
within their respective jurisdictions.
And first it is necessary to distinguish
the question involved from that which
arises when the note endorsed before
negotiation is payable to the maker or
order. In the latter case it is evident
that no valid obligation can be created
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against the maker until indorsed by him sumed to have been that of an original
and transferred. And it has been held promisor, or joint maker. The arguthat in cases of this character the one so ment advanced in support of this theory
indorsing shall be liable as a second is 1, that the party cannot be held as a
indorser : Blatchford v. Miliken, 35 Ill. first endorser, for the reason that he is
434 (1864). ]n Bigelow v. Colton, 13 not the payee, and that no party but the
Gray 309 (1859), the note was payable payee can be first endorser, and put the
to maker or order and was indorsed by instrument in circulation as a commer2. That no
the maker before the third party in- cial negotiable security.
be
a second
to
presumed
be
can
party
as
only
liable
held
was
he
and
dorsed,
indorser. In .Dubois v. Mason, 127 endorser except one to whom the instruMass. 37 (1879), the note was also ment has been indorsed and who has
payable to maker or order, but the third passed title to another. That if a perparty indorsed before the indorsement son indorsing in blank before delivery
by the maker. It was held that he was desires to limit his obligation to that of
a second indorser, he must employ proliable, merely as an indorser. "The
liability of a party," said the court, per terms to signify that intention, the
"whose name appears on the -back of a rule being that a blank indorsement supnegotiable note is determined by the poses that there are no such terms emposition of his signature with reference ployed. 3. That the party cannot be
to other parties, at the time when the held as a guarantor, for the reason that a
note first takes effect by delivery. guaranty is a collateral engagement to
When a note is payable to the maker's answer for the debt, default or niscarown order, it can take effect only when riage of another person, and that as such
indorsed and delivered by him." It is the agreement should be in writing
also necessary to distinguish the question signed by the party to be charged. The
involved from that which arises when party's signature is there but the collatthe note is endorsed by a third party eral agreement is not. 4. Then it is
after its delivery and before its endorse- said, too, that the contract or obligation
ment by the payee, who is not the is ambiguous because the party has failed
maker, and when the endorsement is not to clearly express his intentions, and
in pursuance of any agreement entered that it should therefore be interpreted
into prior to the delivery of the note. most strongly against himself and in
In such case there must be a new con- favor of the payee. That as he cannot
sideration to support the contract, and be held either as endorser or guarantor,
it is conceded that the liability is that of he must be held as an original promisor,
a guarantor. See Rey r. Simpson, 22 as it is clear that he intended to be liable
How. 341 (1859) ; Good v. Martin, 95 in some form.
This doctrine prevails as follows:
U. S. 90 (1877) ; Colburn v. Averill. 30
States Supreme Court, Rey v.
United
(1849).
310
Me.
What then is the liability a9sumed Simpson, 22 How. 341 (1859), upon
when a third person endorses a note, at appeal from the territorial court of
the time of its execution and before its Minnesota; Good v. Martin, 95 U. S.
delivery to the payee, for the purpose of 90 (1877), upon appeal from the terrigiving credit to the maker with the torial court of Colorado. In this case
the court say: "Reasonable doubt of
payee?
I. In the majority of the states it has the correctness of that rule cannot be enbeen settled that in the absence of proof tertained." Where the Supreme Court
to the contrary, the liability assumed is compelled to pass upon a contract of
under such circumstances will be pre- this character, which comes from a state
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in which the character of the obligation
has been settled by adjudication, the
court would undoubtedly interpret the
contract in accordance with the recognised rule prevailing in such state.
Arkansas : Killian v. Ashley, 24 Ark.
511, 515 (1867).
Colorado: Good v. Martin, 1 Col.
165 (1869); Best v. Hoppie, 3 Id. 137
(1876).
In the first of these cases it
is said that a party is presumed to be
an endorser from the fact that his name
is on the back of the note, but that as
soon as it is shown that he signed the
note before its delivery to the payee he
is primafade a joint maker of the note.
Delaware: Massey v. Turner, 2
Houston 79 (1858); Gi!pin v. Marley,
4 Id. 284 (1871).
Georgia: Collins v. Everett, 4 Ga.
273 (1848) ; Quin v. Sterne, 26 Id.
224 (1858).
In the first of these
cases the court was of opinion that
at common law the liability assumed
under such circumstances, would have
been that of a second endorser, but
that under the statutes of Georgia
the party ought to be held liable as a
joint maker.
Louisiana: Smith v. Gorton, 10 La.
Rep. 374 (1836) ; Lawrence v. Oake,
14 Id. 389 (184G); Chorn v. Merrill,
9 La. Ann. 533 (1854); Collins v.
Trist, 20 Id. 350 (1868). In these
cases a party so signing is called a
"surety," and is said to be liable as an
original promisor.
Maine: Colburn v. Averill, 30 Me.
310 (1849); Malbon v. Southard, 36
Id. 147 (1853); Lowell v. Gage, 38
Id. 35 (1854); Woodman v. Boothby,
66 Id. 391 (1876).
Massachusetts: Moies v. Bird, 11
Mass. 436 (1810); (haffee v. Jones,
19 Pick. 260 (1837); Union Bank
v. Wdlis, 8 Met. 504 (1844) ;
Bryant v. Eastman, 7 Cush. 113
(1851); Brown v. Butler, 99 Mass.
179 (1868); Way v. Butterworth, 108
Id. 509 (1871) ; Woods v. Woods,
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127 Id. 141 (1879).
And in this
state it was held, contrary to the rule
which generally prevails, that parol evidence was not admissible to controvert
the presumption that the party intended
to bind himself as an original promisor:
Way v. Butterworth, supra (1871);
Allen v. Brown, 24 Mass. 77 (1878) ;
Gilson v. Stevens Machine Company,
Id. 546 (1878).
In 1874, however,
the legislature of the state interposed,
and passed an act which provided as follows: "Ali persons becoming parties
to promissory notes payable on time, by
a signature in blank on the back thereof,
shall be entitled to notice of the nonpayment thereof, the same as endorsers.'
See National Bank v. Law, 127 Mass.
72 (1879).
Maryland: Sullivan v. wleti, 6 Gill.
181 (1847) ; Ives v. Bosley, 35 Md.263
(1871) ; ThirdNat. Bank v. Lange, 51
Id. 138, 145 (1878).
Michigan: Wetherwax v. Paine, 2
Mich. 555 (1843) ; Rothschild v.
Grix, 31 Id. 150 (1875); Herbage v.
McEntee, 40 Id. 337 (1879).
Minnesota: Pierse v. Irvine, 1 Miun.
369 (1857); McComb v. Thompson, 2
Id. 139 (1858); Marienthal v. Taylor, Id. 147 (1858) ; Robinson v. Bartlett, 11 Id. 411 (1866) ; Stein v.
Passnwre, 25 Id. 256 (1878).
Missouri: Powell v. Thomas, 7 Mo.
440 (1842) ; Lewis v. Harvey, 18 Id. 74
(1853) ; Western Boatmen's Assoc. v.
Woff, 45 Id. 104 (1869); Kuntz v.
Tempel, 48 Id. 71 (1871); Mammon
v. Hartman, 51 Id. 168 (1872), and
the cases cited in the principal case.
New Hampshire: Martin v. Boyd, 11
N. H. 385 (1840) ; Currier v. Fellows,
27 Id. 366 (1853).
New York: Provided the note is a
non-negotiable one, the person signing in
blank on the back and before its delivery
may be held liable as a joint maker or a
guarantor, according to the intent of the
parties. But it does not appear to have
been decided in which capacity the court
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will presume that he signed the instrument. See Griswold v. Slocum, 10
Barb. 402 (1851); Richards v. Warring, I Keyes 576 (1864); Cromwell v.
Hewttt, 40 N. Y. 492 (1869). In the
earlier New York cases it seems to have
been thought that a person signing a
negotiablenote under such circumstances,
was liable as a joint maker, but these
cases have been overruled, and a distinction is now taken by the courts of
that state between negotiable and nonnegotiable instruments. While he may
be a joint maker as to non-negotiable
instruments, he cannot be held as such if
the note was negotiable. What liability
he assumes in the latter case will appear
hereafter.
This distinction between
negotiable and non-negotiable paper,
does not seem to be elsewhere recognised, and has been expressly repudiated
in the following cases: Sumner v. Gay, 4
Pick. 311 (1808); Perkins v. Catlin, 11
Conn. 213 (1836); Lewisv. Harvey, 18
Mo. 74, 76 (1853) ; Kuntz v. Tempel,
48 Id. 71, 77 (1871): Champion v.
Grffllth, 13 Ohio 228 (1844); Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150 (1875);
Herbage v. McEntee, 40 Id. 337
(1879) ; Burton v. Hansford, 10 W.
Va. 470, 483 (1877) ; Chaddock v.
Vanness, 35 N. J. 517 (1871).
In
commenting on this distinction and
expressly repudiating it, Mr. Chief Justiee GnAvs of Michigan says: "It is
somewhat noteworthy that in that state,
where has sprung up this distinction excluding liability as original promisor in
case the note has words of negotiability,
the very cases in which the courts first
dealt with such contracts, and first
recognised and affirmed the liability as
original promisor, were exclusively cases
where the note contained negotiable terms.
Herrick v. Carman, 12 J. R. 160 ; Nelson v. Dubois, 13 Id. 175 ; Campbell v.
Butler, 14 Id. 349; Labron v. Woram,
1 Hill 93. It was not, it would seem,
until Dean v. Hall, in 1837 (17 Wend.
214), that it was judicially suggested

that the right to charge the backer as
an original promisor applied only to nonnegotiable paper. But Judge COwEN,
who gave the opinion in that case,
noticed the previous decisions and proceeded to remark, that in his judgment
they went no further than to establish
that where the defendant was privy to
the consideration and endorsed the note,
I it being non-negotiable, or at most one
payable to order, or to the plaintiff or
bearer and not negotiated, the declaration
might charge the defendant directly as
maker. In Seabury v. Hungerford, 2
Hill 80, a majority of the court proceeded ostensibly on the distinction thus
broached by Judge CowEN, but appear
to have gone somewhat further; and at
length in Hall v. Newcomb, 7 Hill 416,
the court for the correction of errors, by
a vote of seventeen to eight, took the
final step, and decided that the undertaking of the backer of paper having
negotiable terms was that of endorser
merely. The proposition was strongly
contested by members of the court, and
only prevailed after a second argument." See Rothschild v. Grix, 31
Mich. 150, 154.
North Carolina: Such an endorser of
commercial paper is here regarded as
prima facie a joint maker: Baker v.
Robinson, 63 N. C. 192 (1869) ; Roffman v. Moore, 82 Id. 313 (1880).
In the last cited case it is said that in
order to rebut this presumption, a contrary intent must be proven, and "the
intent must be not only that of the person signing but that of the person to
whom the note is payable, and the explanatory evidence is only competent in
a controversy between them, and could
not follow and affect the security when
transferred before maturity to a bona
fide endorsee for value and without
notice."
Ohio : While it is presumed from the
fact that a note is endorsed by one not
the payee, and before it has been endorsed by the payee, that the party has
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assumed the liability of a guarantor, yet
if it appears that the note was endorsed
before delivery and for the purpose of
giving the maker credit with the payee,
he is presumed to have assumed the
liability of a joint maker, and not that
of a guarantor: Bright v. Carpenter, 9
Ohio 139 (1839); Champion v. Gr.ffith, 13 Id. 228 (1844) ; Robinson
v. Ahell, 17 Id. 36 (1848) : Seymour v.
lickey, 15 Ohio N. S. 519 (1864).
Rhode Island: The party so endorsing
is prima facie liable as joint maker in
this state : Perkins v. Barstow, 6 R. I.
505 (1860) ; Matthewson v. Sprague, I
L1. 8 (1834); Manufacturers' 4-Merchants' Bank v. Follitt, 11 Id. 92
(1874) ; Carpenter v. McLaughlin, 12
Id. 270 (1879).
South Carolina: The same rule prevails in this state: Stoney v. Beaubien, 2
AIcMul. 313 (1842) ; Baker v. Scott, 5
Rich. 305 (1852) ; Carpenter v. Oaks,
10 Id. Eq. 17 (1856) ; 31cCrearyv. Bird,
12 Id. Law 556 (1860). Stoneyv. BeaubLien, it will be observed, was a comparatively early case. In it the court reviews
Hill v. Lewis, Skinner 410; Hodges v.
Stewart, I Salk. 1235 ; and Nicholson v.
Sedgwick, 1 Ld. Raym. 180, and says:
"These cases abundantly prove that
one who writes his name on the back of
a note payable to bearer becomes originally liable for the contents." as otherwise no legal effect would result from
the endorsement, and the same principle
is regarded as applicable when a third
party indorses before the delivery of a
note to the payee.
Texas: The liability assumed by such
an endorsement is prima facie that of an
original promisor: Cook v. Southwick, 9
Texas 615 (1853) ; Cart v. Rowland,
14 Id. 275 (1855).
Vermont: Such is the rule in -this
state; Sylvester v. Downer, 20 Vt. 355
(1848).
11. In New Jersey, no legal presumption arises as to the liability which is
assumed by such an endorsement. It is

there held that the mere signature of
a third person creates per se no implied
or commercial contract whatever. That
the liability will be that of a second endorser or that of a surety, according to
the intention with which he became a
party, and that that intent must be
shown by parol evidence. But it appears that if the signature was placed
there before delivery of the note and to
give the maker credit with the payee.
that the liability is that of a surety unless
some different intent is shown: Chaddock v. Vanness, 35 N. J. 516 (1871).
In Virginia, such an endorser is not
presumed to be either an original promisor, a guarantor, a first or a second
endorser. But it is held that such a
blank endorsement impnes that the party
making it intended that the payee should
have a right to elect in what capacity he
would hold the party liable : Orr0kc v.
Colston, 7 Gratt. 189, 199 (1850).
Such is the rule in West Virginia also:
Burton v. Hansford, 10 W. Va. 470,
471 (1877). In this case, the cases in
Virginia are reviewed, and the court
say: "I conclude that when a negotiable promissory note, made payable to a
particular person or order, is first endorsed by a third person, and then
delivered to the payee, such endorser is
primafacie an original promisor or guarantor, as the payee may elect, or the
payee may by endorsing his name above
that of such third person, and transferring the note, make him a second endorser in the commercial sense. But
the true nature of the transaction, and
the understanding of the parties to it at
the time, may be shown by parol proof,
and such proof may destroy this right of
election by the payee, and the third person backing such note may be held liable
only as an original psomisor, or as a
guarantor, or as an endorser, according
to the nature of the tUansaction, and the
original understai.dhig of the parties to
it. If it is shovr. &y evidence that such
third person sigN..,
is name on the back
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of such a note at the time it was made
as security for the maker and for his
accommodation, to give him credit with
the payeee, such proof does not alter the
right of the payee to hold him bound as
original promisor, or as guarantor, or as
endorser, as he may elect, but strengthens
his prima fade right to elect. Such
option may be exercised at any time by
the payee, and so long as he holds the
note, may be changed at his pleasure,
even after the institution of a suit by
him against such third person. If it be
shown that the understanding between
such third person and the payee at the
time of the transaction, was that such
third person should be bound only collaterally, such understanding will destroy the right which the payee would
have otherwise had, of electing to hold
him bound as original promisor." The
court assume that the party who endorses
before delivery to the payee has failed to
indicate the form in which he intended
to bind himself, and that it was, therefore, fair to presume that he intended to
be bound in any manner that the payee
might elect.
In Connecticut, the rule which prevails is said by the courts of that state
to be "peculiar" to their own jurisdiction. A party so endorsing is expressly
declared not to assume the liability of a
joint maker, nor that of an absolute
guarantor, or of a second endorser. In
Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213 (1836),
it is said: "We have always rejected
the doctrine that such an endorsement
constitutes the endorser a joint maker of
the note, or an absolute guarantor,
creating a liability at all events, on the
dishonor of the note by the maker, or a
second endorser of the note, and liable
only to subsequent parties to it." And
the idea that he is a guarantor is again
expressly repudiated in Riddle v. Stevens, 32 Conn. 378, 387 (1865), where
it is said that parol proof is admissible to
show that that was the liability intended
to be assumed, and thus rebut the legal

presumption as to the nature of his liability. In Perkins v. Catlin, supra, th s
liability is defined as follows: "It .waa
always the law in this state, that such an
endorsement, prima fade, implies a contract on the part of the endorser, that the
note is due, that the maker shall be of
ability to pay it when it comes to maturity, and that it is collectible by the use
of due diligence. * * * And if it be
said, that such construction of a blank
endorsement is peculiar to this state, it is
not the less definitely and judicially
settled because it is confined to our jurisdiction."
III. Another theory which is entertained in a few of the states is, that one
who endorses a promissory note before
delivery to the payee, and for the purpose of giving the maker credit, must be
prima fade regarded as a guarantor.
And this theory seems to be next in
favor to that which holds such an endorser to the liability of a joint promisor.
The theory that he is a joint maker is
rejected upon the groumd that had he
intended to assume that liability he would
have signed the note upon its face, along
with the maker. The theory that he can
be held as a first or second endorser, is
not favored, for reasons already referred
to. And it is claimed that he should
therefore be held as a guarantor, and
that the promise is not within the Statute
of Frauds.
California: Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal.
485 (1852)4 Geiger v. Clark, 13 Id.
579 (1859) ; Ford v. Hendricks, 34 Id
As to the promise not
673 (1868).
being within the Statute of Frauds, see
last cited case.
Illinois : Camden v. McCoy, 3 Scam.
437 (1842); Carrollv. Weld, 13 111. 682
(1852); Webster v. Cobb, 17 Id. 464
(1856); White v. Weaver, 41 Id. 409
(1866); Dietrich v. Mitchell, 43 Id. 40
(1867); Stowell v. Raymond, 83 Id. 120
In the last cited case the court
(1876).
say: "Proof that the name was put
there for the purpose of becoming liable
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IV. For reasons already mentioned
as security tat the makers should be
responsible for the payment of the note, the theories that such an endorser ig a
and that this endorser refused to sign as joint maker, a guarantor, or a first enmaker will not rebut the presumption. dorser are rejected, and the party is held
* * * We hold, in order to rebut the prma facie liable as a second endorser,
legal presumption, the proof must be for the reason that without explanatory
evidence it is a necessary presumption
clear and satisfactory as to a different
intention." And as the proof only went that he supposed that he would incur no
liability until after the payee had first
to establish the understanding, that if
the makers did not pay, the endorser endorsed.
Iowa : This rule prevails in this state
would, it was held to constitute an absoand was announced in Fear v. Dunlap,
lute guaranty.
I Greene 335, (1848).
Kansas : Such is the rule announced
New York: The rule prevails here as
in this state "Firman v. Blood, 2 Kans.
all notes which are negotiable as disto
25
Id.
8
Scott,
v.
Fuller
496 (1864);
tinguished from those non-negotiable:
(1871).
Herrick v. Carman, 10 Johns. 224
Kentucky: The rule here is the same:
(1813); s. c., 12 Id. 159 (1815).
Arnold v. Bryant, 8 Bush 668 (1871).
Nebraska: Such seems to be the rule Tillman v. Wheeler, 17 Id. 326 (1820) ;
in this state: Newton Wagon Co. v. Moore v. Cross, 19 New York 227
(1859) ; Bacon v. 3urnham, 37 Id. 614
Diers, 10 Neb. 284; 291 (1880).
T
Nevada: And as to the theory in this (1868); Phelps v. Vischer, 50 Id. 69
state, see Van Doren v. Tjader, 1 Nev. (1872). If it is shown that he endorsed
before delivery of note and for the pur380 (1865).
pose of giving the maker credit with the
one
of
liability
the
that
doctrine
The
so endorsing is to be regarded as that of payee, then the latter may hold him liaa guarantor, seems to have first been ble as a first endorser, but not as guarexpressly ruled in Illinois in Camden v. antor or maker: Spies v. Gilmore, I N.
McCoy, supra, and was based on a mis- Y. 221 (1848); Hall v. Newcomb, 7
construction of early New York and Hill416 (1844); 3forev. Cross, supra.
Oregon: The liability is held to be
Massachusetts cases, especially upon certain obiter dicta contained in Herrick v. that of a second endorser" Kamm v.
Carman, 12 Johns. 159 (1815). In Holland, 2 Oregon 59 (1863), Cogswell
Herrick's Case the party having en- v. Hayden, 5 Id. 23.
Pennsylvania: In Taylor v. McCune,
dorsed in blank before delivery to the
payee, he was held liable as a second 11 Penn. St. 464 (1849), it was authoobligation asendorser, but the court expressed the ritatively settled that the
opinion that if it had appeared that he sumed was that of a second endorser.
had endorsed for the purpose of giving This was followed in Schollenberger v.
the maker credit with the payee, his lia- Nehf, 28 Penn. St. 191 (1857). The
blity would not. have been that of a guar- ruling was adhered to in Jack v. 31orriantor, but might have been converted into son, - Penn. St. 116 (1864), and it
such a liability. That such an endorser was held that parol evidence was inadwao prima fade a guarantor was never missible to show that the liability in
that of a
ruled in any New York or Massachusetts tended to be assumed was
in Schafollowed
was
This
guarantor.
case, although the adjudications of those
states furnished the Illinois court with fer v. F. 4- M. Bank, 59 Penn. St. 144
the authorities upon which it arrived at (1868) ; s. c. 8 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
the conclusion that the liability was that 684. But a memorandum in writing signed
by the party to be charged is admissible
of a guarantor.
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to show that the agreement made between
the parties was that the one so endorsing
should be liable as a guarantor: Eilbert
v. Finkbeiner, 68 Penn. St. 247 (1871).
Tennessee: The liability is that of a
second endorser: Comparreev. Brockway,
11 Hum. 355 (1850) ; Clouston v. Barbierre, 4 Sneed 336 (1857) ; Brinkley v.
Boyd, 9 Heisk. 149 (1872); Iser v.
Cohen, 1 Baxter 421 (1872); Rivers
v. Thomas, I Lea 649, 652 (1878).
But parol evidence is admissible to show
the true contract: Taylor v. French, 2
Lea 257 (1879).
V. The theory that such an endorser
is liable as a first endorser to the payee,
prevails as follows :
Alabama : Jordanv. Garnett, 3 Ala.
610 (1842): Milton v. DeYampert, Id.
648 (1842); Price v. Lavender, 38 Id.
389 (1862); Hooks v. Anderson, 58
Id. 238 (1877).
Indiana: Snyder v. Oatman, 16 Ind.
265 (1861) ; Drake v. Markle, 21 Id.

433 (1863) ; Houston v. Bruner, 39 Id.
But the endorser may
376 (1872).
designate the character in which he intends to be bound, and such designation
will control: Phillips v. Cox, 61 Ind.
346 (1878).
Mississippi: In Jennings v. 7Tomas,
13 S. & Al. 617 (1850), the court say
that the liability of one so endorsing is
prima facie that of an endorser. It is
not entirely clear to our mind that the
court inclined to the opinion that he
would be liable prima faee as a first
endorser, though this construction is generally given to the decision.
Wisconsin: Heath v. Van Cott, 9
Wis. 516 (1859) ; Cady v. Shepard, 12
Id. 639 (1860); Davis v. Barron, 13
Id. 227 (1860); King v. Ritchie, 18 Id.
554 (1864). In Cadyv. Shepard,supra,
it is said parol proof must be introduced
to show that the endorsement was made
before that of the payee.
HENEY WADE RoGazs.

Prerogative Court of New Jersey.
JOHN B. ELLISON

ET AL. V.

I.

H. LINDSLEY.
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F. S. Figh, for appellants.
J. B. Howell, for respondents.
RUNYON, Ordinary.-The time within which the claims of creditors of Herbert G. Hoole, a debtor who had assigned his property
under our Assignment Act, were, by law, to be put in to entitle
the holders to a dividend, expired on the 8th of January. The
appellants were creditors, and intended to file their claim within
the limited period, but being under a mistake, up to the 8th, as to
the time when it ended (they supposed it expired on the 18th
iustead of the 8th), they delayed filing it until the 8th, on which
day they discovered their mistake. On that day they mailed their
claim, at Philadelphia, to the assignee, at Newark, in time to
reach the latter place so as to be delivered by the letter-carrier to
the assignee at about five P. m. of that day. It was not, in fact,
delivered to him until the next day. It does not appear that it
reached Newark before the 9th. On exception to it by the assignee, the Orphans' Court rejected it as not filed in time, and
hence this appeal. The only question presented for decision is,
whether such posting of the claim was a "presenting" (the term
used in the third section of the act) or "exhibiting" (the term
employed in the twentieth section) of the claim within the limited
period, within the meaning of the act. It certainly cannot be held
to be so. If mailing the claim in time to reach the assignee by
due course of mail if no delay should occur, were to be held to be
equivalent to presenting or exhibiting the claim, though it should
not reach the assignee, it would, of course, be so on any other day
than the last day of the limited period as well as on that day.
The statute imposes on the assignee the duty of filing a true list
of all the creditors of the assignor, as shall claim to be such, and
requires that he do so at the expiration of three months from the
date of the assignment: Rev. 87, sect. 5. And to that end the
creditors are to present their claims under oath or affirmation:
Rev. 37, sect. 3. If they fail so to exhibit their claims within the
time limited by the act, their claims will be barred of a dividend
unless the estate shall prove sufficient, after the debts exhibited
and allowed are fully satisfied, or they shall find some other estate
not accounted for by the assignee, before distribution, in which
case they shall be entitled to a ratable proportion therefrom: sect.
20. A claim sent by mail may, of course, never reach the
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assignee. The creditor who has recourse to that method of trans.
mitting his claim takes the risk of its reaching its destination in
due time. The assignee is to know who are the creditors who
make claim as such, by their act in presenting or exhibiting their
claims within the prescribed period.
It is urged, in this case, that the failure to present the claim at
an earlier day was due to a mere mistake on the part of the appellants, and that that fact entitles them to a consideration which they
could not claim if they were guilty of negligence. The alleged
mistake was wholly their own. It arose from misreading the
entry, in their own book, of the time when the limitation would
expire. The Orphans' Court has no power to relieve the appellants from the consequences of their mistake. The language of
the statute is clear, and the court was not at liberty to extend it
by construction: Proprietorsof Morris Aqueduct Co. ads. Jones,
7 Yr. 206; Stelle v. Conover, 3 Stew. Eq. 640. In this connection it may be added, though it has no bearing on the conclusion
reached, that the appellants had time enough, after they discovered
their mistake, to present their claim to the assignee; their error was
in trusting to the mail rather than to send a messenger.
The decree of the Orphans' Court will be affirmed, with costs.
A notice of amercement must be
served personally, on a sheriff, and not
sent by mail; Anonymous, 1 Hal. 159.
Proof of putting into the post-office a
letter containing a notice, is not sufficient
proof of service: Anonymous, 6 Hal. 94 ;
Hudson v. Henry, 1 Caines 66; Hickie's
Case, Law Rep., 4 Eq. 226 ; and see
Futcher v. Hinder, I F. & F. 357.
Where a plea was sent by mail in time,
a judgment of default for want of its
having been received, was opened: Ludlow v. Heycraft, 2 Caines 386; Cole v.
Stafford, Cole & Caines Cas. 110; Stafford v. Cole, 1 Johns. Cas. 413; so,
where the plea was received by the
plaintiff's attorney, who, on inspection,
refused to take it from the post-office :
Clark v. McFarland, 10 Wend. 635.
Notice of trial may be served by post,
unless its receipt be denied: McCourry
v. Suydam, 5 Hal. 245 ; and notice to
substitute another solicitor: Draper v.

Holland, 3 Edw. Ch. 272; and notice
to give security for costs : Abbott v.
Ledden, Bert. N. B. 33. Wilful refusal
to take from the post-office a letter containing process is not service thereof:
Redpath v. Williams, 3 Bing. 443.
Contra, Aldred v. Hicks, 5 Taunt. 186.
Delivery of process sealed up in a letter,
in the absence of the person to whom it is
addressed, is only service from the time
when such letter is opened : Arrowsmith
Service of
v. Ingle, 3 Taunt 234.
notice to quit, sent by mail by a landlord to his tenant, is invalid: Papillon
v. Brunton, 5 H. & N. 518; see May v.
Rice, 108 Mass. 150.
Qumre-Whether depositions taken
under a foreign commission may be returned by mail: Simms v. Henderson,
11 Q. B. 1014.
The officer is not bound to take from
the post-office a letter containing process, on which the postage is unpaid:
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Hart v. Weatherley, 4 Dowl. P. C. 171 ;
Anonymous, I Hill 217; Brossv. Nicholson, I How. Pr. 158.
That a capias in another suit and a
notice of amercement were mailed together, in one envelope, to a sheriff,
more than ten days before the beginning
of the term, and the capias duly served
and returned, is not sufficient proof that
the sheriff received the notice more than
ten days before the beginning of the
term: 3elvin v. Purdy, 2 Harr. 162;
although sufficient as to their receipt;
Smith v. Campbell, 6 Dowl. P. C. 728.
Notice of an allotment of shares sent
by mail to a stockholder, and never
received, is good : Harris's Case, Law
Rep., 7 Ch. 587 ; Townsend's Case, Law
Rep., 13 *Eq. 148; Wall's Case, Law
Rep., 15 Eq. 18; but see Reidpath's
Case, Law Rep., 11 Eq. 86; British
Co. v. Colson, Law Rep., 6 Exch. 108.
Whether the person to whom a letter
is directed, after satisfactory proof of
mailing it, ever received it, is a question for the jury: Starr v. Torrey, 2
Zab. 190; PResident v. Hart, 3 Day491;
Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447;
Tanner v. Hughes, 53 Pa. St. 289;
Warren v. Warren, 1 C., M & R. 250.
As to the presumption from the senders' usual course of business, see Hetherington v. Kemp, 4 Camp. 193 ; Skilbeck
v. Garbett, 7 Q. B. 846; Ward v.
Londesborough, 12 C. B. 252; Spencer
v. Thompson, 6 Ir. C. L. 537.
Whether the postmaster could be held
responsible, see Whitfield v. Despencer,
Cowp. 754; Hordern v. Dalton, I C. &
P. 181 ; Ford v. Parker, 4 Ohio St.
576 ; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 230 ;
1tzgerald v. Burrill, 106 Mass. 446;
Keenan v. Southworth, 110 Mass. 474,
and cases cited ; Fos:er v. Metts, 55
Miss. 77 ; Conwell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio
523; Hutchins v. Brackett, 22 N. H.
252 ; 2 Thomp. on Neg. 819, 898.
Notice sent by mail to South Carolina,
during the rebellion, was held invalid:

Harden v. Boyce, 59 Barb. 425; Todd
v. Neal, 49 Ala. 266 ; Donegan v. Wood,
Id. 242; McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall.
14; Hopkirk v. Page, 2 Brock. 20;
Citizens' Bank v. Pugh, 19 La. Ann.
43; Shaw v. Neal, Id. 156; Lapeyra
v. Robertson, 20 La. Ann. 399.
Where a substituted service of process, &c., by mail, is authorized by statute, a strict compliance therewith must
be shown: Rogers v. Rogers, 3 C. E.
Green 445; Tate v. Tale, 11 Id. 56;
Gaffney v. Bigelow, 2 Abb. N. C. 311,
and note ; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 435 ; J'acobs
v. Hooker, I Barb. 71 : Anonymous, 25
Wend. 677 ; ChautauqueBank v. Risley,
6 Hill 375; People v. Alameda Co., 30
Cal. 182; Gray v. Palmer, 9 Id. 616;
Sharp v. Daugney, 33 Id. 505; Wallace
v. Wallace, 13 Wis. 224 ; Bitten v.
Grtilth, 16 Hun 454 ; Foley v. Connelly,
9 Iowa 240; Clark v. Adams, 33 Mich.
159 ; Wilson v. Basket, 47 Miss. 637.
As to mistakes or omissions in the
name or address, see Walter v. Haynes,
Ry. & Moo. 149 ; Gordon v. Strange,
1 Exeh. 477 ; Oothout v. Rhinelander,
10 How. Pr. 460; Smith v. Smith, 4
Green (Iowa) 267; Leonard v. New
York Bay Co., 1 Stew. Eq. 192 ; Likens
v. McCormick, 39 Wis. 313; Scorpion
Co. v. Marsano, 10 Nev. 370.
Such service is effected generally,
only from the time when the notice is
received: May v. Rice, 108 Mass. 150;
Beg. v. Leominster, 2 B. &S. 391 ; Reg.
v. Slawstone, 18 Q. B. 388; Colvill v.
Lewis, 2 C. B. 50; Reg. v. Richmond,
E., B. & E. 253.; Stevens v. Wheder,
43 Wis. 91 ; Schenck v. McKie, 4
How. Pr. 245 ; Peebles v. Rogers, 5 Id.
208; Crittenden v. Crittenden, Id. 310 ;
Morris v. 3orange, 17 Abb. Pr. 86;
see, however, Radcliff v. Van Benthuysen, 3 How. Pr. 67 ; Van Home v.
Montgomery, 5 Id. 238; Eliott v. Kennedy, 26 Id. 422 ; Schuhardt v. Roth,
10 Abb. Pr. 203.
J. H. STEWART.
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a part of the street.
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by the state from a judgment acquitting
1
nuisance.
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APPEAL

the state as follows:
At the trial an instruction was aslked by

doubt that
"If it is shown by the evidence beyond a reasonable
of

is situated in the city
Market street and the sidewalk thereof
and constantly
Indianapolis, in a densely populated neighborhood,
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used by the citizens of the state for
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case is taken by the state from a judgI In Indiana, where an appeal in a criminal
to be erroneous, no new trial is
ment of acquittal, and the judgment is decided
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granted but the appeal is sustained at

STATE OF INDIANA v. BURDETTA.

situated, and that where said building was situated but eleven feet
remained for the passage of said citizens of said state, you should
find the defendant guilty, such an obstruction of a public highway
being a nuisance within itself." This instruction was refused by
the court, yet, upon its own motion, one was given precisely the
same, except that the last clause was omitted and the following
clause substituted: "and that the obstruction essentially interfered
with the comfortable enjoyment of said sidewalk."
Cropsey & Cooper and John B. Elam, for the state.
J. L. Mitchell, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-The effect of the substitution by the court of the
last clause was, to very materially change the meaning and force of
the instruction. The theory of the instruction, as originally written,
is very different from that asserted by the instruction as framed by
the court. The instruction asked by the prosecution asserts that
it is sufficient for the state to prove the existence of a permanent
obstxuction in the highway, while that framed by the court affirms
that it is not sufficient to show the existence of such an obstruction,
but that the state must show in addition that, "it essentially interfered with the comfortable enjoyment of the sidewalk."
A public street is a public highway, and a sidewalk is a part of
the street: Common Council v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9; State v. Mathis,
21 Id. 277. The common-law doctrine was, "that a public highway was a way common and free to all the king's subjects to pass
and repass at liberty," and that an unauthorized obstruction was
indictable and punishable as a nuisance. Nor was it necessary to
show anything more than that Ihere'was a permanent obstruction
of the public way: People v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396; State v.
Woodward, 23 Vt. 92; Davis v. Mayor, &c., 14 N. Y. 524; Commonwealth v. King, 13 Met. 115; Harrow v. State, 1 Iowa 439.
Counsel for the appellee argued with much force and ingenuity,
that the common-law doctrine does not prevail in Indiana, for the
reason that our state prescribes an essentially different rule. It is
indeed true, as counsel asserts, that we have no common-law
offences, and that criminal prosecutions can only be maintained for
such offences as are prescribed by statute; it does not, however,
follow from this that there is no such thing as an indictable public

344

STATE OF INDIANA v. BURDETIA.

nuisance under our statute. In Bush v. State, 37 Ind. 431, it
was held that there is such an offence, although the statute does
not specially define a public nuisance. In that case it was held, that
" the phrase public nuisance had a very definite meaning ihthe law,
before the statute was adopted." If the case cited should be followed to its logical consequences it would require us to hold that
what was at common law a public nuisance is. such under our statute, and that permanently obstructing a highway is per se a public
nuisance, because it was always such at common law. We are
inclined to believe this to be the correct ruling.
Upon the assumption of the appellee that the state must show
an unlawful act, injurious to the citizens of the state, and one
which essentially interferes with either the free use of property or
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, the conclusion which
he deduces is an incorrect one. The permanent obstruction o a
public street is in itself an unlawful act, especially interfering with
the free use of property as well as the comfortable enjoyment of
life. The right of an adjacent proprietor, in and to the highway, is
one of which the legislature itself cannot deprive him without compensation, nor can the municipal authorities, broad and comprehensive as their powers are, devote the street to private purposes :
Raynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; St. Vincent, fc., v. City/, 32 Am.
Rep. 286.
So far does this rule go that the municipality is itself guilty of
maintaining a public nuisance if it places a permanent obstruction
in the public street: Wartman v. _Philadelphia, 33 Penn. St.
202; State v. Laverack, 84 N. J. Law 201. Even under the
British form of government the king had no power to authorize the
permanent obstruction of the public highway: Viner's Abr., Yuisance. The existence of the permanent obstruction in the highway is, therefore, such an unlawful act as injures the citizens, who
are lot owners on the street and who have a right, as an essential
incident to the enjoyment of their property, to have the street
maintained its full width, free from all obstructions of a permanent
character. This is such a right as may be vindicated either by
injunction or indictment, and its violation is established by evidence
of a permanent encroachment upon the streets: Smith v. State, 3
Zab. 712; Moyamensing v. Long, 1 Pars. 145; Woods's Law, Nuisances, sect. 252; Langsdale v. Bonton, 12 Ind. 467. It is upon
the doctrine liere affirmed that the case of Pettis v. ohnson, 56
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Ind. 539, proceeds. There this court held that a stairway erected
upon a public alley of a city by express authority of the municipal officers, was per se a public nuisance, against which an adjacent
proprietor might enjoin. The same general doctrine is declared
in the late and well considered case of Commonwealth v. Blaisdell,

107 Mass. 234.

The conclusion upon principle as well as from authority, must be
that if the unlawful act of obstructing a public highway, did injure
others than those owning real estate upon the street, such unlawful
act would be of itself a public nuisance.
Broader and more comprehensive rights than those of adjacent
proprietors, as well as a far more numerous class of citizens than
those owning lots abutting on the street, are, however, injuriously
affected by the unlawful obstruction of a public highway. All the
citizens are affected, for, "a highway," to adopt one of the definitions found in the books, "is a road which every citizen has a right
to use."
The right to pass and repass upon a public highway is not
restricted to any part, for, "the public are entitled, not only to a
free passage along the highway, but to a free passage along any
portion of it not in the actual use of some other traveller:" 1
Hawks. P1. Cr., ch. 32, sect. 11; Angell on Highw., sect. 226.
The same doctrine is declared by this court in Garton v. City, 57
Ind. 429, where it is held that the entire width of a sidewalk must
be maintained convenient and safe for the use of travellers. In
Sherlock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 35, the same general principle is
explicitly affirmed. The question in all cases of the character of
the present one is not, whether travel was interfered with, but
whether there was an unlawful encroachment upon a public street
by the erection of a permanent obstruction.
The citizens of the municipality who are invested with the local
government are all affected by the obstruction of a street, because
all in the capacity of tax-payers, are charged with the burden of
,o keeping the streets as that they may be used in safety by the
citizens of the state. So far does the law upon this subject extend
that even though the obstruction be placed on the street by a
wrongdoer, the municipality may, under some circumstances, be
liable for any injuries which may be caused by such an obstruction.
It cannot be doubted that in keeping the streets clear and free from
obstructions, all the tax-payers of a municipality are interested,
VOL.
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and therefore the obstruction of a street necessarily affects a very
great number of the citizens of the state. Upon the facts hypothetically stated in the instruction, the rule of law must be that the
obstruction is per se a nuisance, or we might have on the same
street, indeed oh the same square, an obstruction pronounced by
one jury to be a nuisance, and another of the same character and
dimensions, by another jury declared not to be a nuisance. If
any other rule than that insisted upon by the state is declared to
be the law, each particular case, although the facts should be
identically the same, might be differently decided, the result in
each case depending upon the peculiar views of the jury trying the
cause. The only just and safe rule is, that a permanent structure
materially encroaching upon a public street in a thickly inhabited
part of a large city, is a nuisance of itself. There is no injustice
in this rule, because no doctrine is more seasonable or more firmly
settled than that the streets of a city are for the use of the public,
and that no one can have the right to divert a street, or any part
of a street, to private purposes, and one who does so divert a street
ought not to be permitted to compel the state to show specifically
that the enjoyment of the life or property of some part of the citizens was essentially interfered with. The necessary consequence
of the unlawful act is to essentially interfere with the enjoyment
of life and property, and this being so it was the duty of the court
to instruct the jury as matter of law, that an obstruction of the
character described in the state's instruction was of itself a nuisance.
If it be the law, as it unquestionably is, that an unlawful encroachment upon a public highway by the erection of a structure of a
permanent character, in a popular part of a large city, is an act
injuriously affecting all the abutters, tax-payers, and indeed, all the
citizens of the state, there is no reason for instructing that the
state must supplement the evidence of the character and location
of the obstruction with evidence showing that it interferes with the
comfortable enjoyment of the sidewalk.
The character and location of the obstruction being shown, it
was the duty of the court to have told the jury, as a matter of law,
that such an obstruction was a public nuisance. Unless the conclusion from the existence of the facts be deemed and treated as
matter of law, the result will be a line of cases with precisely the
same facts, but with diverse judgments, varying with the views of
the jury by which each cause is tried. The rule which must
guide is one of law, and should be declared by the court, and as
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the rule of law was correctly expressed in the instruction asked, it
should have been given.
The instruction given by the court was of such a character as
to convey to a man of ordinary capacity an incorrect view of the
law applicable to the case. As we have already shown, the rule at
common law is beyond all question, that a permanent and material
encroachment upon a public street is per se a nuisance, and as we
have further shown our statute does not change that rule, it must
be held error to so instruct a jury as to lead them to believe that
in addition to showing the character, situation and surroundings of
the obstruction, it was necessary for the state to show that the comfortable enjoyment of the sidewalk was essentially interfered with.
But one inference can be drawn from the instruction of the court,
and that is that there must be some other facts shown in addition
to those stated in the instruction. Having hypothetically stated
all the facts which it was incumbent upon the state to prove, the
last clause of the instruction reading as follows: "and the said
obstruction essentially interfered with the comfortable use of the
sidewalk," is added, thus conveying to the jury the impression
that something more than the facts recited in the instruction must
be proved. If the fActs stated in the part of the instructions preceding the clause just quoted were all that the state need prove,
then by adding that clause an erroneous rule was declared, because
that clause asserts that in addition to the facts recited the state
must show some other fact or facts.
The distinction between the temporary occupancy of public
streets for commercial or building purposes and its permanent
obstruction is well illustrated in the leading case of Woods v.
fears, 12 Ind. 515. It is not doubted that sidewalks may, when
authorized, be temporarily occupied for private purposes, but temporary occupancy for authorized private purposes is quite a different thing from the erection of a structure of a permanent character.
But even with respect to temporary use of such streets it must be
borne in mind that it may go to the extent of becoming a public
nuisance: Rex v. Russell, 6 East 427; Commonwealth v. Passmore, 1 S. & R. 219; Palmer v. Silverthorn, 32 Penn. St. 65;
Commonwealth v. Milliman, 13 S. & R. 403.
Appeal sustained at costs of appellee.
The statute under which the defendant

son who shall erect, or continue, or main-

was indicted is as follows: "Every per-

tain any public nuisance, to the injury of
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any part of the citizens of this state, shall
be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars."
There are no common-law offences indictable in the state of Indiana. All
The
crimes are defined by statute.
words "public nuisance" are used- in
the statute, but reference is had to the
common law for a definition of this term.
This is the uniform practice of the courts.
Notw'thstaudiug all crimes are declared
to be statutory, the courts cannot get entirely rid of the common law, nor can the
legislature aid them to do so. " There
is in, perhaps, all cases of statutory
crime a greater or less mingling of common-law principles with the statutory.
words. Indeed, there is no place where
the principles of the common law prevail, not even within the jurisdiction of
the United States courts, or in states
where they have no common law crimes,
where statutory crime, pure and simple,
and as an existence entirely separate from
the common law, is known. The statute may be the strong swimmer, that
boasts of being moved by no current,
and of possessing all force in its own
arm; still, around it, in all its strength,
and in all its parts, and constantly bearing it up, is the ever-present ocean of
the common law :" Bish. on Stat. Cr.,
sec. 364.
Judge WASHINGTON, in U. S. v. Jones,
3 Wash. C. C. Rep. 215, charged the
jury: "If a statute of the United
States uses a term, which is known, and
its meaning fully ascertained by the
common or civil law, from one or the
other of which it is obviously borrowed,
no doubt can exist that it is necessary
to refer to the source whence it is taken,
MAXHALL,
for its precise meaning."
C.J., said, in U. S. v. Palmer,3 Wheat.
630: "Of the meaning of the term
robbery, as used in the statute, we think,
no doubt can be entertained. It must
be understood in the sense in which it is
recognised and defined at common
law." The same rule has been laid

down in the following cases: U. S.
v. Wilson and Ibrter, Bald. 78 ; U.S. v.
Durkee, 1 McAllister 196 ; Apple v.
Apple, 1 Head 349 ; State v. Flenming,
2 Strob. 464 ; U. S. v. MagiUl, 1 Wash.
C. C. 463; U. S. v. Armstrong, I Curt.
451 ; Adams v. Turrentine, 8 Ired. 147 ;
Kitchen v. Tyson, 3 Murphy 314; Maya
v. Wilson, I N. H. 55 ; Thurberv. Blackbourne, 1 Id. 242 ; RICHARDSON, C.
J., in Tappan v. Bellows, 1 N. H. 107;
Medical Col. of Ohio v. Zeigler, 17 Ohio
St. 52 ; Moore v. Vance, 1 Ohio 19 ;
"Turney v. Yeoman, 14 Id. 218; Merchant's Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 411 ;
Oakes v. Munroe, 8 Cush. 287; Bacon
v. Charlton, 7 Id. 583; Hillhouse v.
Chester, 3 Day 211 ; Buckner v. Real
Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 536; Bx parte
Vincent, 26 Ala. 145 ; Burk v. State, 27
Ind. 430; State v. Taylor. 29 Id. 517.
But where municipal legislation declared certain acts done, to amount to
the crime of piracy, the terin "piracy"
used in the statute is not sufficient to
give the United States courts jurisdiction of the cause of action; such a
"piracy" not being an offence against
the common law, of which offence the
United States courts have jurisdiction: Dole v. N. B. Mutual Ins. Co., 2
Clif. 418.
ENGLISH JAsEs.-At common law,
there is no doubt that the obstruction of
a public highway, so as to make it less
commodious to the public, is a public
nuisance: 2 Roll. Abr., Nuisance B. ;
Overton v. Freeman, 11 C. B. 867 ; Rex
v. Griesly, I Vent. 4; as if a man with
a cart use a common pack and prime
way, so as to plough it up and render it
less convenient for riders : Regina v.
Leech, 6 Mod. 145 ; a stile across a
footpath, raised to a greater height than
usual: Bateman v. Burge, 6 C. & P.
391, per PARK, J.; but building a
house in a larger manner than it was
before, whereby a street is darkened
more than it was previously, is not a
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nuisancia: Rex v. Webb, Ld. Rayin. for lighting the town: Reg v. Longton
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